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Jenkins: Damages: Recovery of Special Damages Due to Land Being Made Unfit
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
his decision. There are clear precedents for the proposition that the
existence of an identical issue is tested by necessity for the same probative
facts.' 5 The Court properly concluded that a mere difference in name
between the two grounds does not prevent the operation of the full faith
and credit clause when the facts by which both grounds must be established are the same.
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DAMAGES: RECOVERY OF SPECIAL DAMAGES DUE TO
LAND BEING MADE UNFIT FOR A SPECIAL USE
Watson v. Jones, 36 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1948)
Defendant was sued for the wrongful cutting of ninety-seven pine
trees which were on the land of the plaintiff. The latter claimed special
damages in that the property had been acquired for a tourist and trailer
park and the trees that were cut had a peculiar value for ornamental and
shade purposes, due to the intended use of the premises. Defendant contended that the computation should be based on the value for any normal purpose rather than for the specific use chosen by the plaintiff. The
jury found a verdict of $3500 for the plaintiff. On motion for new trial
the lower court granted a remittitur of $1000 in lieu of a new trial.
Upon acceptance by plaintiff, defendant appealed on the ground that a
verdict of even $2500 was excessive. HELD, the correct measure of
damage is the injury done to the land in the light of the specific purpose intended and not merely the difference in its market value for normal user before and after the cutting. Judgment affirmed.
The usual measure of damages in an action to recover for permanent
injury to real property is the difference in the fair value of the property
2
immediately before and immediately after the injury.' In Florida,
5

Wilson Cypress Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 109 F.2d 623 (C. C. A. 5th 1940);

Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N. D. Iowa

1940); Coleman v.

Coleman, 157

Fla. 515, 26 So.2d 445 (1946).

'Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Saffold, 130 Fla. 598, 178 So. 288 (1938); Gasque v.
Ball, 65 Fla. 383, 62 So. 215 (1913).
'Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Saffold, 130 Fla. 598, 178 So. 288 (1938).
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however, and in certain other jurisdictions, 3 upon destruction of improvements or crops possessing a value independent of the realty on which
they stand or grow, the measure of damages is this value. Other jurisdictions have held that recovery may be had for either the diminution
in the value of the land or the value of the specific item destroyed 4
when regarded independently. In the instant case, counsel made a wise
choice of remedy; had the action been based on trespass de bonis asportatis 5
or on trover for conversion,O instead of on trespass quare clausum fregit,
the measure of damages would have been merely the value of the trees
at the time of the wrongful taking and removal.
In computing damages for trespass quare clausum fregit the inquiry
will not be limited either to the diminution of the market value of the
land or to the market value of the property destroyed when the property
7
has a special intrinsic value due to the use for which it is intended.
In order to recompense the injured party adequately, the proposed use s
and even the possible use9 of the property must be considered. This
rule is particularly adaptable to cases involving the wrongful destruction
of shade or ornamental trees, inasmuch as such trees may well have little
commercial value and their severance from the realty often has no effect
on the market value of the tract of land.1 0
In FloridaEast Coast Ry. v. Peters,3 ' the Supreme Court of Florida
applied to tort actions the contract rule of foreseeability, namely, that
recoverable damages are limited to those that would occur in the normal
course of events or that may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of the parties. Upon reversal and retrial12 the Court
indicated that it did not mean to place this limitation on tfespass actions,
saying that the rule was applicable to negligence actions, as distinguished
'Grell v. Lurnsden, 206 Iowa 166, 220 N. W. 123 (1928); Reed v. Mercer County Fisc. Ct, 220 Ky. 646, 295 S. W. 995 (1927); Tripp v. Bagley, 75 Utah 42, 282
Pac. 1026 (1929); Honaker Lumber Co. v. Kiser, 134 Va. 50, 113 S. E. 718 (1922).
'Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Geiser, 68 Kan. 281, 75 Pac. 68 (1904); Thompson
v. Boydstun, 189 Okla. 530, 118 P.2d 236 (1941).
'Garrett v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 135 Fla. 398, 186 So. 269 (1938).
"Skinner v. Pinney, 19 Fla. 42, 53 (1882).
"4 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGEs 2981 (3d ed. 1903).

'Babcock v. Postal Tel. Co., 117 S. C. 304, 109 S. E. 116 (1921); Stephensville,
N. & S. T Ry. v. Baker, 203 S. W. 385 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
'Shell Pipe Line v. Svrcek, 37 S. W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
"Gilman v. Brown, 115 Wis. 1, 91 N. W. 227 (1902).
'72 Fla. 311, 371, 73 So. 151, 168 (1916).
"See Florida E. C. Ry. v. Peters, 77 Fla. 411, 426, 83 So. 559, 564 (1919).
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